Wednesday, October 24, 2007


Military: Victory for Israel, Britain and France. Political: Victory for Egypt. The Suez Crisis

Background

Events Leading up to and Contributing to the Precipitation of the Crisis
The events which contributed most by far to the Suez Canal Crisis were those surrounding the nationalization and closure of the canal. In 1949, Egypt closed the canal to Israeli shipping, and blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba, in blatant contradiction to the terms of the Constantinople Convention of 1888. Many argued that this action also constituted a violation of the Rhodes armistice agreement. in which British banks and business held a 44% stake. This nationalization was done in order to raise revenue for the construction of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile River. The United States and Britain had previously agreed to help pay for this project, but cancelled their support after Egypt bought tanks from communist Czechoslovakia, and extended diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China.
Eden tried to persuade the British public of the need for war and so, perhaps in an attempt to recall World War II-era patriotism, he compared Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal with the nationalism of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler twenty years earlier. However, the very first comparisons between 1930s dictators and Nasser during the crisis were made by the Labour Opposition leader, Hugh Gaitskell and the left-leaning tabloid newspaper, the Daily Mirror. Eden had been a staunch opponent of Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and he claimed that a display of force was needed to prevent Nasser becoming another expansionist military threat.

The State of the Canal
In order to pressure Israel, the Arab world commenced a series of economic sanctions against it in the early 1950s. Amongst other actions, Israel's neighbors all but sealed their borders, and thoroughly severed all forms of transportation and communication across them. The Arab world closed its ports to Israeli shipping, as well as to ships originating from or destined for Israeli ports. This action made shipping to Israel almost unfeasible, since Israel would have to be the only stop in the region for a ship which anchored there. All flights departing from, landing in or passing through Israel were forbidden from passing over Arab air space. Individuals who had an Israeli visa in their passport were refused entry into Arab countries. Arab governments also pursued a campaign designed to dissuade private companies from doing business with Israel, and put a good deal of pressure on other governments to participate in their embargo. In July, 1950, Egypt passed a law requiring that the captains of ships passing through Egyptian ports guarantee that their cargo was intended for local consumption at their port of immediate destination. These restrictions were designed to prevent such cargo from being shipped to Israel from neutral ports. While all these measures had some effect on the Israeli economy,

Arab Economic Pressure on Israel
In 1955, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser imported arms from the Soviet bloc to build his arsenal for the confrontation with Israel. He announced it on August 31, 1955:
Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the Land of Israel. ... There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death.
Under the terms of this deal, Czechoslovakia sold Egypt 200 tanks, 150 artillery pieces, 120 MiG jet fighters, 50 jet bombers, 20 transport planes, 15 minesweepers, 2 destroyers, 2 submarines, hundreds of vehicles and thousands of modern rifles and machine guns. Although the arms were to be delivered promptly, Egypt paid for them over the span of twelve years with shipments of cotton to the Soviet bloc. This volume of arms was unlike any the Middle East had ever seen, and it was coupled with the sale of 100 tanks, 100 MiG fighters and hundreds of other items to Syria, as well as the provision of Soviet and Czechoslovakian trainers and assistance personnel. This sudden change in local balance of power pressured Israel to act quickly, and acted as a catalyst to the Suez Canal Crisis.

Egyptian Arms Deal
Nasser's apparent role in the dismissal of British military leader Glubb Pasha in Jordan prior to the canal company nationalization had greatly annoyed British Prime Minister Anthony Eden.
The French were befouled by Nasser's support for Muslim insurgents in French Algeria. Similar to the British, the French news called Nasser a "dictator".

Egyptian Influence in the Arab World
The Free World Allies opened a discussion on August 1st, with a tripartite meeting at 10 Downing Street between British Foreign Affairs Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, U.S. Ambassador Robert D. Murphy and French Foreign Affairs Minister Christian Pineau

Suez Crisis Anglo-Franco-American Diplomacy

Main article: Protocol of Sèvres Protocol of Sèvres
In the summer of 1955 Egypt began using fedayeen to conduct a proxy war against Israel. These units—often trained and equipped by Egypt—would infiltrate across what was then the Israeli-Egyptian border at Gaza, and conduct guerilla raids against Israeli targets (mostly civilian in nature). These raids contributed to Egyptian-Israeli tensions during this time.

Fedayeen

Invasion
Israeli military planning for the conquest of Sinai hinged on four main military objectives; Sharm el-Sheikh, al-Arish, Abu Uwayulah, and the Gaza Strip. The Egyptian blockade of the Tiran Straits was based at Sharm el-Sheikh, and by capturing the town, Israel would have access to the Red Sea for the first time since 1953, which would allow it to restore the trade benefits of secure passage to the Indian Ocean. The Gaza Strip was chosen as another military objective because Israel wished to remove the training grounds for Fedayeen groups, and because Israel recognised that Egypt could use the territory as a staging ground for attacks against the advancing Israeli troops. Israel advocated rapid advances, for which a potential Egyptian flanking attack would present even more of a risk. al-Arish and Abu Uwayulah were important hubs for soldiers, equipment, and centres of command and control of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai. Capturing them would deal a deathblow to the Egyptian's strategic operation in the entire Peninsula. The capture of these four objectives were hoped to be the means by which the entire Egyptian Army would rout, and fall back into Egypt proper, which British and French forces would then be able to push up against an Israeli advance, and crush in a decisive encounter.

Operation Kadesh: The Israeli conquest of the Sinai Peninsula
The Israel's chief-of-staff, Major General Moshe Dayan, first planned to take the vital Mitla Pass. Dayan planned for the 1st Battalion, 202nd Paratroop Brigade, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Eytan, a veteran of the Israel War of Independence, and future head of the IDF ; to drop at Parker's Memorial, near one of the defiles of the pass, Jebel Heitan. The rest of the brigade, under the command of Colonel Ariel Sharon would then advance to meet with the battalion, and consolidate their holdings.
On the 29th October 1956, Operation Kadesh, the conquest of the Sinai, began when the battalion dropped into the Peninsula. However, the landing had not gone as planned, and the forces were now several miles from their target, and wasted valuable hours, and physical energy, moving into their positions opposite the Egyptian positions in the pass. The Israelis then dug in, received artillery and weapons from another airlift, and awaited the rest of the brigade.

Early Actions in southern Sinai
Meanwhile, the 9th Infantry Brigade captured Ras an-Naqb, an important staging ground for that brigade's later attack against Sharm el-Sheikh. Instead of attacking the town by a frontal attack, in typical Israeli fashion, they enveloped the town, and negotiated through some of the natural chokepoints into the rear of the town, and surprised the Egyptians before they could ready themselves to defend. The Egyptians surrendered, with no Israeli casualties sustained.
The 4th Infantry Brigade, under the command of Colonel Josef Harpaz, captured al-Qusaymah, which would be used as a jumping off point for the assault against Abu Uwayulah.

Early actions along the Gulf of Aqaba, and the central front
The portion of the 202nd under Sharon's command continued to advance to meet with the 1st Brigade. En route, Sharon assaulted Themed, and was able to storm the town through the Themed Gap, and was able to capture the settlement. On the 30th, Sharon linked up with Eytan near Nakla.
Dayan had no more plans for further advances beyond the passes, but Sharon decided to attack the Egyptian positions at Jebel Heitan. Sharon would send his lightly armed paratroopers against dug-in Egyptians supported by air and heavy artillery, as well as tanks. Although the Israelis succeeded in forcing the Egyptians to retreat, the heavy casualties sustained would surround Sharon with a lot of controversy. Most of the deaths sustained by the Israelis in the entire operation, were sustained at Jebel Heitan.

Battle of Jebel Heitan, 202nd Paratroop Brigade under attack
Further information: Operation Musketeer (1956) and Operation Telescope
To support the invasion, large air forces had been deployed to Cyprus and Malta by the UK and France and many aircraft carriers were deployed. The two airbases on Cyprus were so congested that a third field which was in dubious condition had to be brought into use for French aircraft. Even RAF Luqa on Malta was extremely crowded with RAF Bomber Command aircraft. The UK deployed the aircraft carriers HMS Eagle, Albion and Bulwark and France had the Arromanches and Lafayette on station. In addition, HMS Ocean and Theseus acted as jumping-off points for Britain's helicopter-borne assault (the world's first). Meanwhile the Israel Border Police militarized the Israel-Jordan border (including the Green Line with the West Bank) which resulted in the killing of 48 Arab civilians by Israeli forces on October 29 (known as the Kafr Qasim massacre).
On October 30, in the morning, United Kingdom and France sent an ultimatum to Egypt. They initiated Operation Musketeer on October 31, with a bombing campaign. On November 3, 20 F4U-7 Corsairs from the 14.F and 15.F Aéronavale taking off from the Arromanches and Lafayette carriers, attacked the Cairo aerodrome. Nasser responded by sinking all 40 ships present in the canal, closing it to further shipping until early 1957.
On late November 5, the 3rd Battalion of the British Parachute Regiment dropped at El Gamil Airfield, clearing the area and establishing a secure base for incoming support aircraft and reinforcements. At first light on November 6, Commandos of Nos 42 and 40 Commando Royal Marines stormed the beaches, using landing craft of WWII vintage (LCM Landing Craft, Mechanized). The battlegroup standing offshore opened fire, giving covering fire for the landings and causing considerable damage to the Egyptian batteries and gun emplacements. The town of Port Said sustained great damage and was seen to be alight.
Acting in concert with British forces, 500 heavily-armed paratroopers of the French 2nd Colonial Parachute Regiment (2ème RPC), hastily redeployed from combat in Algeria, jumped over the al-Raswa bridges from Noratlas Nord 2501 transports of the ET (Escadrille de Transport) 1/61 and ET 3/61, together with some combat engineers of the Guards Independent Parachute Company. Despite the loss of two soldiers, the western bridge was swiftly secured by the paras, and F4U Corsairs of the Aéronavale 14.F and 15.F flew a series of close-air-support missions, destroying several SU-100 tank destroyers. F-84Fs also hit two large oil storage tanks in Port Said, which went up in flames and covered most of the city in a thick cloud of smoke for the next several days. Egyptian resistance varied, with some positions fighting back until destroyed, while others were abandoned with little resistance.
In the afternoon, 522 additional French paras of the 1er REP (Régiment Étranger Parachutiste, 1st Foreign Parachute Regiment) were dropped near Port Fouad. These were also constantly supported by the Corsairs of the French Aéronavale, which flew very intensive operations: for example, although the French carrier LaFayette developed catapult problems, no less than 40 combat sorties were completed. In total, 10 French soldiers were killed and 30 injured during the landing and the subsequent battles.
British commandos of No. 45 Commando assaulted by helicopter, meeting stiff resistance, with shore batteries striking several helicopters, while friendly fire from British carrier-borne aircraft caused heavy casualties to 45 Commando and HQ. Street fighting and house clearing, with strong opposition from well-entrenched Egyptian sniper positions, caused further casualties.

End of Hostilities
Before the withdrawal, Lester B. Pearson, who would later become the Prime Minister of Canada, had gone to the United Nations and suggested creating a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Suez to "keep the borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out." The United Nations accepted this suggestion, and after several days of tense diplomacy, a neutral force not involving the United States, Britain, France or most of the Soviet Bloc was sent with the consent of Nasser, stabilizing conditions in the area. Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his efforts. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force was Pearson's creation and he is considered the father of the modern concept of "peacekeeping".

Introduction of UN Peacekeepers
Eden's resignation marked, until the Falklands War, the last significant attempt Britain made to impose its military will abroad without U.S. support. However, Nigel Ashton argues "that British strategy in the region changed very little in the wake of Suez. Harold Macmillan was every bit as determined as Eden had been to stop Nasser, although he was more willing to enlist American support in the future for that end. Some argue that the crisis also marked the final transfer of power to the new superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.
The incident demonstrated the weakness of the NATO alliance in its lack of planning and cooperation beyond the European stage. From the point of view of General de Gaulle, the Suez events demonstrated that France could not rely on allies anymore. Britain withdrew its troops in the midst of the battle without warning its allies. In 1957, following these events, the French government launched an autonomous nuclear programme conducted in the Sahara,
The imposed end to the crisis signalled the definitive weakening of the United Kingdom and France as Global Powers. Nasser's standing in the Arab world was greatly improved, with his stance helping to promote pan-Arabism and reinforce hostility against Israel and the West. The crisis also arguably hastened the process of decolonization, as the remaining colonies of both Britain and France gained independence over the next several years.
After Suez, Aden and Iraq became the main bases for the British in the region while the French concentrated their forces at Bizerte and Beirut.
UNEF was placed in the Sinai (on Egyptian territory only) with the express purpose of maintaining the cease-fire. While effective in preventing the small-scale warfare that prevailed before 1956 and after 1967, budgetary cutbacks and changing needs had seen the force shrink to 3,378 by 1967. The Egyptian government then began to remilitarize the Sinai, and demanded that the UNEF withdraw. This action, along with the blockade of the Strait of Tiran, led directly to the Six Day War. During the war, Israeli armed forces captured the east bank of the canal, which subsequently became a de facto boundary between Egypt and Israel and the canal was therefore closed until June, 1975.

Aftermath

Walter Arnstein, Britain Yesterday and Today: 1830 to the Present (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001).
Ahron Bregman, Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947 (London: Routledge, 2002). ISBN 0-415-28716-2
Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East (I B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2003). ISBN 1-86064-811-8
Leuliette, Pierre, St. Michael and the Dragon: Memoirs of a Paratrooper, Houghton Mifflin, 1964
David Tal (ed.), The 1956 War (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001). ISBN 0-7146-4394-7
Bertjan Verbeek, "Decision-Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis. Small Groups and a Persistent Leader" (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003).
Yergin, Daniel (1991). The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-671-50248-4. . Chapter 24 is devoted entirely to the Suez Crisis. See also

"The Suez canal and the nationalization by Colonel Nasser" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, August 1st, 1956 Fr. (views of Nasser EG, Pineau FR, Lloyd UK, Murphy US, Downing street, comment on international tension)
"The new pilots engaged for the Suez canal" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, October 3rd, 1956 French (views of Port Said, the canal and Ferdinand de Lesseps' statue few weeks before the Suez Crisis, incl. a significant comment on Nasser)
"French paratroopers in Cyprus" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, November 6th, 1956 French (details on the French-British settings and material, views of Amiral Barjot, General Keightley, camp and scenes in Cyprus)
"Dropping over Port Said" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, November 6th, 1956 French (views of British paratroopers dropping over Port Said, comment on respective mission for the French and British during Operation Amilcar)
"Suez: French-British landing in Port Fouad & Port Said" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, November 9th, 1956 mute (views of French-British in Cyprus, landing in Port Fouad, landing Port Said, Gal Massu, Gal Bauffre, convoy)
"The French in Port Said" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, November 9th, 1956 mute (views of prisonners and captured material, Gal Massu, para commandos, Egyptian cops surrender, Gal Beauffre, landing craft on the canal)
"Dropping of Anglo-French over the canal zone" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, November 14th, 1956 French (views of 2 Nordatlas, paratroopers, dropping of para and material circa Port Said, comment on no bombing to secure the population)
"Canal obstructed by sunken ships" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, November 14th, 1956 French (views of troops in Port Said, Ferdinand de Lesseps' statue, comment on the 21 ships sunken by the "dictator")

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